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Ethics: Balancing Ethical Disclosure Requirements
with Statutory Regulations for Lawyers Practicing
Before Regulatory Agencies
I. Introduction
"Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from [the] conflict between a
lawyer's responsibilities to [the] clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own
interest."' The traditional attorney-client privilege and its underlying confidentiality
principle are being challenged by regulatory agencies when attorneys fail to disclose
to the agencies the improprieties of the attorneys' government-regulated clients
While regulatory agencies continue to rely on traditional theories of liability, as well
as their own regulations,3 recent enforcement actions against attorneys have also
relied on the ethical rules which guide attorneys' professional conduct
The enforcement actions have left unresolved whether an attorney must abandon
the attorney-client confidentiality rule by disclosing a client's continuing or future
crime or fraud.' The traditional lawyer's role is that of zealous advocate for the
interests of the client.' In contrast, some regulatory agencies contend that lawyers
representing government-regulated companies have a responsibility to the public, not
just to their clients.7 Furthermore, the regulatory agencies deny the existence of any
conflict and maintain that their regulatory disclosure requirements coincide with
established ethical rules.8 Attorneys, however, claim that expanding the disclosure
1. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Preamble/Scope (1988).
2. Remarks of Harris Weinstein, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, United States
Department of Treasury, in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER 403,406 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 779, 1992) [hereinafter Remarks of Harris
Weinstein].
3. John K. Villa, Emerging Theories of Liability for Lending Counsel, in THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER, supra note 2, at 93, 97.
4. See In re Fishbein, No. OTS AP 92-19 passim (Office of Thrift Supervision, Dep't Treas. Mar.
I, 1992) (notice of charges) [hereinafter Notice of Charges, Fishbein] (administrative complaint by Office
of Thrift Supervision against law firm alleging, inter alia, ethical violations in performance of bank
examination).
5. Jonathan J. Lerner, Traversing the Legal Ethics Minefield of the 1990's: When Does the
Corporate Counsel Become a Cop?, in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER,
supra note 2, at 9, 14.
6. Charles W. Wolfram, Mapping the Minefeld: The Applicable Ethics Rules and Conflicting Duties,
in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER, supra note 2, at 53, 56 [hereinafter
Wolfram, Mapping the Minefield]; see Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, How a Big Law Firm Was
Brought to Knees by Zealous Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at A4 (stating that the strategy
was to be literally truthful without assisting the opposition in discovering damaging information). The
strategy was typically sanctioned by professional ethics rules absent violating any law or assisting the
client in violating a law. Id.
7. See Notice of Charges, Fishbein, supra note 4, $ 182-85; THOMAS C. RICE & BLAKE A. BELL,
LIABILITY OF LENDER'S COUNSEL (ALI-ABA Course of Study 1991), available in Westlaw, C665 ALI-
ABA 271.
8. Remarks of Harris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 412-13.
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requirements by adding a responsibility to volunteer information to regulatory
agencies, which in effect represent the public, would violate ethical rules protecting
the client 9
Part II of this comment will explain the existing framework of disclosure sources
and the effect of the. attorney's role on disclosure. This comment emphasizes the
disclosure requirements of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct and all
ethical rules herein refer to the Oklahoma Rules unless otherwise indicated.
Substantive departures from the disclosure requirements of the American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct are specifically identified. Part
it of this comment will discuss particular theories upon which the regulatory
agencies rely. Part [V will suggest alternative approaches to resolve the present
conflict between the attorneys and the regulatory agencies as to an attorney's duty
to disclose the client's improprieties.
II. Existing Framework of Disclosure Sources
A. Ethical Disclosure Obligations in Oklahoma
In 1988, the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (the Rules) were approved
and adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to replace the state's existing Code
of Professional Responsibility." The Oklahoma Rules are a modified version of
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the ABA
Model Rules), which were adopted in 1983." As a result of the modifications, the
Oklahoma Rules are both more and less discretionary, depending on the circum-
stances, than the ABA Model Rules. Thus, an attorney .practicing before a
regulatory agency in Oklahoma is subject to disclosure requirements distinct from
the requirements of other states which adopted the ABA Model Rules without
modification.
Oklahoma's Rules of Professional Conduct have traditionally resolved the ethical
disclosure issues created by the conflicting interests of an attorney, a client, and the
legal system." The "Rules provide the parameters within which an attorney-client
relationship functions. 3 Initially, the attorney-client relationship must be defined
by the client who determines the purpose, or scope, of the lawyer's representation,
9. H. Brent Helms, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery & Enforcement Act: An Ethical
Quagmire for Attorneys Representing Financial Institutions, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 277,283 (1992).
But see Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (stating that "duties set forth in
[professional responsibility rules] establish the minimum level of competence required of attorneys for
the protection of the public").
10. In re Adoption of the Oklahoma Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 59 OKLA. B.J. 846
(1988).
11. Letter Regarding Proposed Model Rules by Gomer Smith, Jr., Chairman, Model Rules
Committee, 57 OKLA. B.J. 32 (1986).
12. OKLAHOMA RuL.S OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Preamble/Scope (1988) (stating that the Rules,
in part obligatory and in part discretionary, define the nature of the relationship between attorney and
client).
13. Id.
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subject to the legal system and the lawyer's professional responsibilities. 4 Once an
attorney-client relationship has been established, the Rules provide the framework
to resolve ethical disclosure problems. 5 The Rules specify the circumstances in
which the lawyer may be obligated or permitted to disclose the client's confidential
communications.'
6
B. Regulatory Disclosure Obligations
Administrative and regulatory agencies represent another source of disclosure
requirements.' 7 In the past, regulatory efforts to broaden lawyers' disclosure duties
met with mixed success. Today, however, regulatory agencies, such as the Office
of Thrift Supervision and the Securities and Exchange Commission, each have
statutory disclosure regulations. Thus, in addition to the Rules, an attorney
practicing before a regulatory agency must adhere to that agency's disclosure
regulations.
1. Office of Thrift Supervision Disclosure Regulations
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) regulates the lawyers who practice before
the agency.' The rules of the OTS, formerly the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), provide that the attorney-client privilege and the related confidentiality
principle do not create a right to mislead." The OTS regulations are intended to
coincide with the ethical rules.
The OTS may bar any person from practicing before the agency who has engaged
in "dilatory, obstructionist, egregious, contemptuous, . . . or other unethical or
improper professional conduct."' Furthermore, the OTS prohibits willfully aiding
and abetting violations of the agency's laws, rules or regulations. Sections
563.180(b)(1) and (b)(2) prohibit the regulated company and its agents, including
14. Id. at Rule 1.2.
15. Id. at Preamble/Scope.
16. Id.; see id. at Rule 1.6 cmt.
17. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 513-590 (1992) (prescribing rules for practicing before the Office of
Thrift Supervision).
18. Compare SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that
lawyers have an obligation to report client's securities laws violations to the SEC) with In re Carter,
[1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84,172 (Feb. 28, 1991) (holding that an
attorney is not required to disclose client's illegal act either publicly or to affected third party). See
Stevens & Thomas, supra note 6, at A4 (stating that in the early 1980s, the Treasury Department briefly
considered requiring attorneys to notify the Internal Revenue Service if the attorney believed a client was
filing a questionable return).
19. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 513-590 (1992); Remarks of Harris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 406-07.
20. 12 C.F.R. § 513.4 (1992).
21. Remarks ofHarris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 406 (stating that if an attorney makes a statement,
the statement cannot be misleading or a partial truth).
22. Id. at 412-13.
23. 12. C.F.R. § 513.4(a)(3) (1992).
24. Id. § 513.4(a)(4).
1993]
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lawyers, from knowingly making false or misleading statements or omissions as to
material facts to the regulatory agency or within the company or to auditors. '
2. Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosure Regulations
Like the OTS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates lawyers
who practice before the SEC.' Under SEC Rule 2(e), an attorney who engages in
unethical or improper professional conduct may be suspended from practicing before
the SEC.' Rule 10(b)(5) prohibits false or misleading statements, whether written
or oral, to the agency.' An attorney violates Rule 10(b)(5) if he knowingly makes
untrue statements of material fact, or omits a material fact that renders misleading,
any statements made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."
C. Effect of Attorney's Role on Disclosure
Based on the attorney's role in representing the client, different disclosure
requirements apply.' The rules that govern an advocate in the courtroom differ
from those that apply to an advisor and from those that apply to a lawyer in the
bank examination process.3' When representing a client, a lawyer may perform
various functions, including advocate, advisor, negotiator, or evaluator. 2 Each
function defines a different relationship among the lawyer, the client, third parties
and the legal system?3
As an advocate, the lawyer zealously represents the client's position under the
rules of the adversay systemn.T Although an attorney representing a client as a
litigator has a duty to argue the client's case as persuasively as possible, the attorney
25. Id. §§ 563.180(b)(1), (b)(2).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 201,2(e) (1992).
27. Id. Rule 201.2(e) permits the SEC to suspend or prohibit an attorney from practicing before the
SEC if it finds the attorney is not qualified to represent others, lacks character or integrity or has engaged
in improper or unethical conduct. Id. Rule 201.2(e) further suspends or prohibits an attorney from
practicing before the SEC if the attorney willfully violated or aided and abetted the client in violation
of the federal securities laws or regulations. Id.
28. Remarks of Harris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 407.
29. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
Compare Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14(e), which prohibits misrepresentation,
nondisclosure and fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with tender offers.
12 C.F.R. § 201.14(e) (1992).
30. Remarks of Harris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 408-10 (stating that a law firm acting as agent
for a regulated.client may have disclosure responsibility distinct from that required if performing role of
evaluator or advocate).
31. Id.
32. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Preamble (1988). A fifth function is that of
intermediary, in which the lawyer operates as an advisor and as a spokesperson between two clients to
reconcile their divergent interests. Id.
33. See L. Ray Patterson, The Limits of Lawyer's Discretion and the Law of Legal Ethics: National
Student Marketing Revisited, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1252 (stating that the principle of loyalty and the
rules resulting therefrom are determined by three factors: nature of client, role of lawyer, and legal
process).
34. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1988).
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must also comply with the ethical obligation of confidentiality.3" The Oklahoma
Rules require a lawyer to keep in confidence information relating to representation
of a client, unless disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules or other law.36
As an advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the
client's legal rights and obligations and the resulting implications.37 The attorney,
however, may not counsel a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct."
The lawyer must not be deterred merely because the proffered advice may be
unfavorable to the client.39 In fact, the lawyer is obligated to clarify the limits of
the representation if the client expects assistance contrary to the Rules or other
laws.'
A negotiator seeks results advantageous to the client but consistent with the
requirements of honest dealings with others.4 As an evaluator, the lawyer
examines a client's legal affairs and reports to the client or to others.42 Lawyers
practicing before regulatory agencies could be called upon to perform these roles
successively based on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer representing a
financial institution in responding to a bank examination report will provide reasons
why any disputed issues should be resolved to the financial institution's advantage.
The resolution of the disputed issues will likely be a negotiated compromise,
requiring progress reports of corrective measures taken to resolve the disputed
issues. Thus, the lawyer may then represent the financial institution as an evaluator,
reporting to the regulatory agency as to the client's corrective actions taken in
response to the bank examination report.
A final role that an attorney might perform is that of accessory or agent to a
client's improper conduct.43 A lawyer is prohibited from knowingly assisting a
client's crime or fraud by both the Rules and the regulatory agencies." However,
specifically defining the point at which an attorney strays from performing a proper
function, such as advocate or advisor, to acting as accessory or agent is difficult.45
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also id. at Rule 1.6.
37. Id. at Preamble.
38. Id. at Rule 1.2(c).
39. Id.; see also id. at Rule 2.1 cmt.
40. Id. at Rule 1.2(d).
41. Id. at Preamble.
42. Id.
43. Remarks of Harris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 410.
44. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2(c) (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 513.4(a)(4)
(1992).
45. The OTS has claimed that, where regulatory disclosure pursuant to a bank examination is filtered
through the law firm representing the financial institution being examined, the law firm succeeds to the
disclosure obligations of'the financial institution and in fact becomes the financial institution's agent.
Notice of Charges, Fishbein, supra note 4, 45-51. As the financial institution's agent, the interposing
law firm is prohibited from knowingly making false or misleading statements or omissions as to material
facts. 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b)(1) (1992).
19931
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Il. Analysis of Particular Issues & Treatment
A. Traditional Theories of Civil Liability
Once a regulated company suffers a loss attributable to improper conduct, the
governing agency may try to prove that the company's attorneys were knowingly
involved in fraudulent transactions that contributed to or hid the loss." Regulatory
agency actions against attorneys may include claims based on traditional theories
of liability.
47
1. Malpractice
A legal malpractice4 ' claim is founded on a breach of the lawyer's duties to a
client, whether the client is an individual or an organization.49 The theory of
malpractice liability requires that a lawyer exercise the degree of care that is
commonly observed by other professionals in the industry." A lawyer who fails
to provide the ordinary diligence of lawyers in similar situations is subject to
liability in damages to the client.5
In FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers,52 the FDIC,'as conservator of a defunct bank,
was permitted to bring a malpractice claim against the bank's attorneys. The bank's
officers had intentionally and fraudulently overvalued the bank's assets and inflated
profits to induce investment from outside investors." The attorneys' negligence was
based on their failure to make an independent investigation, as was the custom of
securities counsel, in preparing certain syndication documents.'
The court in O'Melveny rejected the attorneys' position that a lawyer owes "no
duty to uncover a client's fraud nor to advise the client and the world of that
fraud." '5 An attorney must act competently to avoid public harm once the client's
dishonesty is discovered.' The attorney's duty of care includes protecting the client
from liability which may occur from distributing false or misleading information to
prospective investors."
46. Villa, supra note 3, at 104. An attorney who is unwittingly used by an organization or its
management to engage in improper activities is distinguished. Id. For example, an attorney is unlikely
to have first-hand knowledge of any unwritten understandings between the financial institution-client and
its borrowers. Id.
47. Id. at 97.
48. The elements of malpractice coincide with those for negligence: duty, breach of that duty,
proximate causation, and damages. WILLIAM L. PROSSER Er AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 117-82
(8th ed. 1988).
49. Villa, supra note 3, at 98.
50. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1986).
51. Id.
52. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
53. Id. at 746.
54. Id. at 749.
55. Id. at 748.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 749.
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The attorneys in O°Melveny argued that the FDIC's claim for relief was barred
since the FDIC "[stood] in the shoes" of the wrongdoers at the bank.-8 The
attorneys sought to enforce the general principle that the perpetrator of a fraud
cannot seek relief as a victim of that fraud. 9 However, since the bank was the
client, and not its officers, the misconduct of those officers could provide a defense
for the attorneys only if the officers' misconduct could be attributed to the bank.'
Since the wrongdoers were acting adversely to the bank and not for its benefit, the
court refused to attribute the officers' conduct to the bank or to the FDIC."
In contrast, where the wrongdoers benefit without directly harming the
corporation, a malpractice claim could be barred. In Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman &
Seidman,' the corporate plaintiff was precluded from alleging malpractice against
its auditors who had "stepped into the shoes" of management that was itself
involved in fraudulent activities. The fraud by management of inflating inventory
was against third parties, not the corporation itselfi' When the organization sued
its auditors for not detecting the fraud, the court determined that no cause of action
existed.' As a participant in the fraud, the organization could not also be a victim
since the element of reliance on any fraudulent representations was missing.'
Thus, under Cenco, a regulatory agency could be barred from alleging a malpractice
claim.
2. Fraud
Fraudulent conduct includes misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure of
a material fact.' In especially egregious cases, an attorney may be charged with
direct participation in the client's fraudulent activities. 7 In In re Fishbein,' the
OTS claimed that a law firm which interposes itself between the client and the
regulatory agency succeeds to the same disclosure obligations as the client. Thus,
under Fishbein, the law firm could be subject to liability for misrepresentation or
nondisclosure of material facts.'
3. Aiding & Abetting
Regulatory agencies have sought to hold attorneys civilly liable for aiding and
abetting their clients in violations of regulations or breaches of fiduciary duties.'
Whether aiding and abetting constitutes a tort cause of action is disputed.7 Aiding
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 750.
61. Id.
62. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
63. Id. at 454-56.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 48, at 1023.
67. Villa, supra note 3, at 99.
68. Notice of Charges, Fishbein, supra note 4, $ 45-51.
69. Id.
70. Villa, supra note 3, at 101.
71. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
19931
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and abetting allegations have however been directed at attorneys in the securities
context.
72
B. Theories Predicated on Ethical Rules
Since a law firm's insurance coverage typically has a dishonesty exclusion, the
regulatory agencies do not necessarily "win" by proving that an attorney committed
fraud or misrepresentation or aided and abetted a client's improper conduct.73 Thus,
the agencies have pursued new theories of liability against attorneys.74 Recently,
the agencies have targeted ethical violations as the means to seek recompense."
Although professional standards are not meant to give rise to civil liability," "[t]he
attempt to deny that there is anything in [the Rules] that is relevant to the legal duty
owed by a lawyer to his client is ... quite wrong.' '
The regulatory agencies' ethics-based theories are problematic since they could
alter the fundamental relationship between attorneys and their clients. " Traditional-
ly, an attorney serves his client as advocate and/or advisor.79 The regulatory
agencies' theories have been criticized for suggesting that an attorney be both
auditor of his client's conduct, prepared to abandon the client at any sign of
impropriety, as well as a reporter to governmental agencies about his client's
actions."
1. Duty to Disclose Client Wrongdoing to Others
A duty to disclose a client's wrongdoing to parties outside the attorney-client
relationship assumes a significant level of knowledge on the part of the attorney."x
Three situations exist in which an attorney may learn of a client's improper
conduct."2 First, an attorney may learn of a client's wrongdoing which was
(1982) (recognizing no statutory tort of aiding and abetting).
72. See Mercer v. Jaffa, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, P.C., 736 F. Supp. 764, 775-78 (W.D. Mich. 1990)
(discussing requirements for liability of securities lawyer for aiding and abetting); Electronic Lab. Supply
v. Motorola, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 67, 68-69 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding securities attorney not liable under
Lanham Act for aiding and abetting).
73. Villa, supra note 3, at 99.
74. Id. at 115.
75. Id. at 108.
76. The Rules are not to be used as a basis for civil liability. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT pmbl. (1988); see, e.g., Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)
(finding that violation by attorney of disciplinary rules does not by itself create cause of action); Bickel
v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Iowa), affid, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1978) (finding no private
cause of action for alleged violation of professional responsibility code); see also Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266
S.E.2d 108, 112-13 (Va. 1980) (stating that Model Code provides basis for disciplinary proceedings, not
civil liability, against offending attorney).
77. ANDREw L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 662 (3d ed. 1989).
78. Villa, supra note 3, at 117.
79. Id.
80. ld.; see Helms, supra note 9, at 283.
81. Villa, supra note 3, at 129; see, e.g., OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1
(1988).
82. Villa, supra note 3, at 118.
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previously committed outside the attorney's representation. 3 Second, an attorney
may learn of client wrongdoing committed during the course of the attorney
representation.' Finally, an attorney may learn of a client's intention to commit
some future impropriety.' Only in the latter two situations does the attorney need
inquire as to disclosure obligations.'
a) Confidentiality
The overriding obstacle to an attorney's disclosure of information learned from
his client is the attorney's ethical obligation to retain inviolate the confidences and
secrets protected by the attorney-client privilege.' The general rule that the lawyer
may not reveal the client's confidences is subject to limited exceptions."B Under
Rule 1.6(b)(1) of the Oklahoma Rules, a lawyer is permitted, upon reasonable
belief," to reveal "the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime."" Oklahoma's rule is broader than the correspond-
ing ABA Model Rule which only permits a lawyer to reveal information necessary
to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that is likely "to result in
imminent death or serious bodily harm."91 Absent that specific injurious type of
crime, the ABA Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from revealing a clients crime,
except in connection with a fee dispute or to defend himself.' Thus, under the
Oklahoma Rules, an attorney has more discretion to reveal the client's communica-
tions because the rule encompasses a wider variety of crimes.
A second exception to the duty of confidentiality permits a lawyer to disclose
information "as otherwise permitted under these [R]ules."93 Finally, the Rules
require, rather than permit, disclosure of confidential client communications
pursuant to law or court order.' Oklahoma added this provision to make explicit
what is merely implied by the ABA Model Rules.95 This last exception seems to
apply to agency statutes and regulations which clearly are laws and which may,
depending upon their statutory or regulatory interpretation, require disclosure of
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1988).
88. Id.
89. See Statement of Policy Adopted by the American Bar Association Regarding Responsibilities
and Liabilities of Lanyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered
by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAW. 543, 545 (1975) (stating that no obligation
or right exists to disclose a client's fraud if a reasonable doubt exists).
90. OKLAHOMA RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(b)(l) (1988).
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1983).
92. Id.
93. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (1988).
94. Id. at Rule 1.6(c).
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (1983) (containing no express
mandatory provision to disclose pursuant to law or court order, but implying authorization as necessary
for representation).
19931
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confidential information. Notwithstanding these three exceptions, a presumption
should exist against supersession of Rule 1.6.'
b) Candor
An attorney is usually not responsible for the veracity of a client's assertions
absent some affirmation, such as an affidavit or statement in court, by the
attorney.' Advocacy, which requires client confidentiality, is subject to Rule 3.3
which sets forth the attorney's duty of candor to a tribunal." Rule 3.3 is generally
given a narrow construction based on an adversary system theory which presumes
that the opposing sides will put forth their best information and the tribunal will
decide which is the truth." Once the advocate purports to have personal knowledge
as to the client's assertions, the attorney is subject to Rule 3 .3."
The Oklahoma Rule is stricter than the corresponding ABA Model Rule, which
merely concerns false statements and nondisclosure of material facts."0 ' In
contrast, an attorney in Oklahoma is prohibited from knowingly making false
statements of fact or law, regardless of materiality, to a tribunal." Likewise, Rule
3.3(a)(2) requires disclosure by the attorney of a fact, whether or not material, if
necessary to avoid assisting the client in perpetrating a crime or fraud."° Circum-
stances could exist where failure to make a disclosure constitutes an affirmative
misrepresentation.° 4
A lawyer is responsible for knowingly offering false evidence to a tribunal."5
If material evidence was offered which is later known by the attorney to be false,
the attorney must advise the client to remedy the falsehood." If the client refuses,
the lawyer must promptly disclose the "false character" to the tribunal." If a non-
client offered the false evidence, prompt disclosure to the tribunal is also required,
without any preliminary counseling between the attorney and the non-client."'0
Under Oklahoma Rule 3.3(b), these duties "are continuing," 9 whereas the
corresponding ABA Model Rule provides that the duties terminate at the conclusion
96. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1988).
97. L at Rule 3.3 cTnt.
98. Id at Rule 3.3.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. MODEL RULES C'F PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a) (1983).
102. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1988).
103. Id. at Rule 3.3(a)(2).
104. Id. at Rule 3.3 crit; see State ex reL Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Moss, 577 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Okla.
1978) (finding that concealment of facts by one with duty to disclose is deceitful); Sellers v. Sellers, 428
P.2d 230, 237 (Okla. 1967) (finding no privilege of nondisclosure absent confidential relationship and
nondisclosure constitutes material misrepresentation); see also OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c) (19F8) (professional misconduct includes "conduct involving... misrepresenta-
tion").
105. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1988).
106. Id. at Rule 3.3(a)(4)(A).
107. Id.
108. Id. at Rule 3.3(a)(4)(B).
109. l at Rule 3.3(b).
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of the proceeding before the tribunal."' However, both versions of 3.3 apply "even
if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6."'
c) Truthfulness
An attorney is responsible for the truthfulness of statements made in transactions
with persons other than the client."' This responsibility does not constitute an
affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts, but merely prohibits
false statements, omissions, and misrepresentations."' While representing a client,
the attorney "shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to
a third person.""' 4 The attorney may not make a misrepresentation by affirming
another party's statements known to be false nor by failing to act."5 Furthermore,
substantive laws could require a lawyer to disclose information to avoid being
deemed to have assisted in the client's crime or fraud."6 Rule 4.1(b) requires
disclosure by an attorney to a third person of a material fact if necessary to avoid
assisting the client in perpetrating a crime or fraud."7 However, the disclosure
requirement under Rule 4.1(b) is subject to the confidentiality requirement of Rule
1.6."' Thus, in contrast to Rule 3.3, supra, which prioritizes disclosure to a
tribunal over confidentiality, disclosure under Rule 4.1(b) could be prohibited by
Rule 1.6.
2. Duty to Disclose Within Client Entity
Beyond any duty to disclose to parties outside the attorney-client relationship,
certain kinds of knowledge on the part of an attorney as to a client's questionable
conduct could trigger the attorney's disclosure duty within the client entity."9 Such
a duty is less likely to offend traditional notions of the attorney-client relationship
since any. disclosure would be to constituents of the client and presumably in the
best interest of the client.'2" Rule 1.13 of the Oklahoma Rules is based on the
fiduciary duty owed to an organization by its officers and other constituents.1
2'
Rule 1.13(b) provides the basis for disclosure of a client's wrongdoing within the
client organization.'" Rule 1.13(b) contains qualifying language such as the
110. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(b) (1983).
111. Id.
112. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1988).
113. Id. at Rule 4.1 cmt.
114. Id. at Rule 4.1(a).
115. Id. at Rule 4.1 cmt.
116. Id.
117. Id. at Rule 4.1(b).
118. Id. at Rule 4.1 cmt.
119. Villa, supra note 3, at 125.
120. Id. As a practical matter, however, any disclosure "up the corporate ladder" has a strong
disincentive and could jeopardize the attorney's continued employment by going over the heads of those
who might be responsible for retaining him. Id.
121. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1988).
122. Id. at Rule 1.13(b).
1993]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
attorney "knows" of improper plans in a "matter related to the representation"; the
plans must violate some obligation; the violation must be "imputed" to the client's
organization; and the violation must be "likely to result in substantial injury" to the
organization.'" Consequently, violations of law which cannot substantially harm
the client are not addressed by Rule 1.13(b). 24 Therefore, an attorney could not
take action under the Rule if the attorney believed that the entity, even if caught,
would only have to pay a minor fine and would suffer only slight damage to its
public image." Significant wrongdoing must be perpetrated to invoke the
Rule.'
According to Rule 1.13(b), the uncovered illegality must occur in a "matter
related to the representation."'' The limiting phrase may be designed to discour-
age lawyers from interfering in corporate affairs.'" So long as the illegality is
beyond the scope of the matter for which the lawyer's assistance was retained, the
attorney would be under no duty to invoke Rule 1.13(b). 9 A retainer letter or
other agreement specifying the law firm's responsibilities is good evidence for
establishing the scope of the representation.'30
A corporate client acts through its constituents, which include its officers,
directors, shareholders, and employees.'3 ' Where a constituent is acting illegally
or adversely to the organization, a lawyer may have to report to the "highest
authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable
law."'3 The highest authority could be the chief executive officer, the board of
directors, or the independent directors.' Thus, merely consulting the board of
directors could be insufficient and the lawyer may have to report to the independent
directors.
Rule 1.13(b) favors the client entity as is evidenced by the remedies available to
a lawyer." The requisite actions by the attorney include advising the wrongdoer
to consider refraining from those actions that violate the law, suggesting that a
separate legal opinion be obtained, and reporting the violation to a higher authority
in the organization.3 Thus, the.Rule contemplates a measured inquiry within the
entity, working up the organization's decision-making hierarchy.'36 The lawyer is
specifically directed to minimize the risk of revealing confidential information to
123. Id.
124. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 242 (1985).
125. Id.
126. Villa, supra note 3, at 128.
127. OKLAHOMA RumIs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1988).
128. WOLFRAM, supra note 50, at 744.
129. Villa, supra note 3, at 128.
130. Id.
131. OKLAHOMA RumEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. (1988).
132. Id. at Rule 1.13(b)(3).
133. Id. at Rule 1.13 cmt.
134. Id. at Rule 1.13(b).
135. Id.
136. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 124, at 242.
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outsiders.'37 If the highest authority refuses to correct the wrongdoer's illegal
conduct, an attorney in Oklahoma has an obligation to resign from representihg the
client-organization. 3 1 In contrast, the ABA Model Rules are not as strict as
Oklahoma, providing the attorney in such circumstances the option to withdraw.3
Although the list of remedies is not exclusive, the premise of Rule 1.13(b) is that
disclosure is prohibited except in extraordinary circumstances.'"
The American Bar Association (ABA) addressed the concept of internal
disclosure in 1940 in response to an attorney's request for advice on client
confidences and disclosure to a corporate board of directors. 4' An attorney had
drafted a contract for a trust company to buy out the interest of certain beneficia-
ries."' In the course of that representation, the attorney advised the trust company
to disclose to the beneficiaries certain improprieties by trust company employ-
ees. 43 After the transaction was completed without his further involvement, the
attorney learned that the trust company had not made the recommended disclosure
prior to consummating the transaction.'"
The ABA committee concluded that such a disclosure should be to the client and
not to third persons. 45 The ABA committee reasoned that the attorney was not
bound to disclose the information to third parties since the information was not
acquired with the intention to commit a future crime." The committee deter-
mined, however, that the attorney should reveal the information to the trust
company's board of directors so that the board could take any corrective action to
protect the company from the wrongful acts of its management.47
3. Duty to Investigate
A duty to disclose assumes the attorney has actual knowledge.48 However,
knowledge cannot be avoided by an attorney simply by "closing [his] eyes." 4
Knowledge can be "inferred from [the] circumstances. ' A regulatory agency
137. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1988).
138. Id. at Rule 1.13(c). See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
139. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.13(c), 1.16(b)(1)-(b)(2) (1983).
140. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 124, at 242.
141. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 202 (1940).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.13(b), 3.3(a), 4.1 (1988)
(providing, respectively, that specified action be taken only after attorney has knowledge of violation;
that attorney cannot knowingly be less than candid toward a tribunal; and that attorney cannot knowingly
disclose false information to third person nor, subject to rule 1.6 confidentiality, withhold material facts
from that person).
149. See Remarks of Harris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 408.
150. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Terminology (1988) ("Knowingly,' '[k]nown,'
or '[k]nows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred
from the circumstances.").
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could allege that an attorney should have known or suspected wrongdoing.'
Thus, an attorney may have a duty to pursue and investigate those alleged
suspicions." As a practical matter however, little authority, statutory or case law,
exists for the proposition that an attorney has a duty to investigate.'3
Failure to investigate in certain circumstances could constitute deliberate
ignorance, which in turn could constitute knowledge for aiding and abetting
purposes if the attorney was under a duty to disclose wrongdoing."s4 In Wyle v.
R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.,5 the court found that the law firm's failure to
investigate the substeance of certain representations made on behalf of the client
amounted to knowledge. In Wyle, the law firm affirmed in court the client's denial
of antitrust violations." The law firm failed to investigate its client's assertion,
even after learning that the client had previously been fined for such violations.'"
The duty to investigate was also explained in State v. Zwillman"'5 when an
attorney was convicted for falsifying claims in a scheme to defraud an insurance
company. The court concluded that an attorney is not responsible for deciding the
truth or falsity of a client's representations, unless the attorney has actual knowl-
edge, or unless, from the facts within his personal knowledge or professional
representation, he should know or reasonably suspect that the client's representations
are false."9 An attorney's duty is not to judge the client, but to seek all that the
client is entitled to under the law." Thus, even for a matter within the attorney's
representation, a duty to inquire arises only if reasonable grounds for suspicion
exist. '6
4. Duty to Withdraw
Although an attomey may not be obligated to disclose a client's known or
suspected wrongdoing, either within the entity or to outside third parties, the
attorney may have a duty to withdraw from representing the client.'6 That duty
could be permissive cr mandatory depending on the circumstances." For example,
151. Villa, supra note 3, at 129-30.
152. Id.
153. The Oklahoma Rules expressly addressing duties to investigate are limited. See, e.g.,
OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rules 1.1, 1.6(a), 8.1(a) (1988).
154. See Remarks offlarris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 408 (stating that professional responsibility
requires attorneys to investigate, where necessary, the factual basis for their opinion and representations);
WOLFRAM, supra note 50, at 709-10 (stating that an evaluating lawyer is required to determine the
accuracy of the facts stated by the client if the attorney has reason to suspect that they are inaccurate or
incomplete).
155. 709 F.2d 585 (9.h Cir. 1983).
156. Id. at 588.
157. Id. at 590.
158. 270 A.2d 284 (QJ. Super. App. Div. 1970), cert. denied, 274 A.2d 56 (NJ. 1971).
159. Id. at 289.
160. Id.
161. Villa, supra note 3, at 132.
162. OKLAHOMA RULEs OF PROFFSSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1988).
163. Id.
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under Rule 1.13(b), if the attorney has advised the appropriate management level
of improper conduct and has received no response, the attorney is required to
withdraw from representation under Rule 1.16."" Upon termination of representa-
tion, an attorney must reasonably protect the client's interests.
6
1
Rule 1.16 provides for declining or terminating representation." Rule 1.16(a)
sets forth several situations in which withdrawal is mandatory. For example, an
attorney must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the
lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Oklahoma Rules or other
laws. 67 Mandatory withdrawal is also prescribed if the attorney reasonably
believes that the client is using the attorney's services to pursue a crime or fraud."~
Furthermore, an attorney must withdraw if the client has already used the attorney's
services to commit a crime or fraud."' The latter two mandatory withdrawal
situations again illustrate the higher professional responsibility standard established
in Oklahoma compared to the corresponding ABA Model Rule, which merely
permits, rather than requires, withdrawal in those situations.7
Permissive withdrawal is addressed in Oklahoma Rule 1.16(b).' An attorney
may withdraw if a client fails to substantially fulfill an obligation regarding the
lawyer's services and has been given reasonable notice that the attorney will
withdraw."r Rule 1.16(b) includes a catch-all provision to withdraw for "other
good cause."'7
IV. Analysis of Approaches to Disclosure
Since the regulatory agencies have recently brought several significant enforce-
ment actions against attorneys with varying results, the extent of the attorney's
disclosure duty must be clarified. For example, on March 2, 1992, the OTS filed
an administrative complaint seeking $275 million from the New York law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler (Kaye Scholer) 75 The OTS claimed that
164. Id.; see also id. at Rule 1.13(c).
165. Id. at Rule 1.16(d).
166. Id.
167. Id. at Rule 1.16(a)(1). The client's mere request that the attorney engage in an improper course
of conduct does not create an obligation on the attorney to decline or withdraw from representation. Id.
at Rule 1.16 cmt.
168. Id. at Rule 1.16(a)(3).
169. Id. at Rule 1.16(a)(4).
170. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rules 1.16(b)(1), (b)(2) (1983).
171. OKLAHOMA RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.16(b) (1988).
172. Id. at Rule 1.16(b)(2).
173. Id. at Rule 1.16(b)(4).
174. On August 9, 1989, pursuant to the provisions of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, the Office of Thrift
Supervision succeeded the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation as the regulatory agency
charged with the supervision and regulation of all savings associations and savings and loan holding
companies.
175. Notice of Charges, Fishbein, supra note 4. The OTS also obtained an order to freeze the assets
of Kaye Scholer, which applied as well to the assets of the individual partners. In re Fishbein, No. OTS
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Kaye Scholer violated its responsibility to the public by concealing damaging
information about its former client, Lincoln Savings and Loan Association of Irvine,
California (Lincoln), " which was seized in 1989 by the government regula-
tors.'" The OTS specifically charged Kaye Scholer with ethical and legal
violations including knowingly disregarding material facts in rendering advice to
Lincoln, failing to disclose material facts to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB),"' and obstructing and misleading the FHLBB in its examination of
Lincoln.' 7 On March 10, 1992, Kaye Scholer agreed to a $41 million settlement
with the OTS (the Kaye Scholer Settlement)."s
The hasty settlement left unresolved whether an attorney must abandon the
attorney-client privilege by disclosing a client's crime or fraud.'' As alleged by
the OTS, lawyers representing government-regulated companies have a responsibili-
ty to the public, not just to their clients.'" In contrast, the traditional lawyer's role
is that of zealous advocate for the interests of the client.' Since the Kaye Scholer
Settlement, that role has been questioned.'
A. Analogous Disclosure Actions
Federal regulatory agencies argue that a lawyer has a duty to disclose a client's
impropriety to the regulatory agency.'85 The agencies contend that an attorney is
responsible to the public for the adequacy of a regulated entity's internal procedures
for regulatory compliance.'" Regulatory agencies have sued attorneys based on
the attorney's failure to ensure the client's compliance with applicable regula-
tions."' Regulatory agencies have relied not only on traditional theories of civil
liability, but also on analogous situations to reconcile the regulatory agencies'
perspective on disclosure with the attorney-client relationship. '
AP 92-20, slip op. at 11 :Office of Thrift Supervision, Dep't Treas. Mar. 1, 1992) (temporary order to
cease and desist).
176. Notice of Charges, Fishbein, supra note 4, 1 1182-85. Lincoln was wholly owned by American
Continental Corporation, a publicly-held corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona and
which, in turn, was contnlled by Charles H. Keating, Jr. Id. 11 3-5.
177. Notice of Charges, Fishbein, supra note 4, 1 5.
178. The FHLBB is governed by the Office of Thrift Supervision. Hereinafter, the terms "FHLBB"
and "OTS" are used interchangeably.
179. Notice of Charges, Fishbein, supra note 4, passim.
180. In re Fishbein, No. OTS AP 92-19, slip op. at 13 (Office of Thrift Supervision, Dep't Treas.
Mar. 10, 1992) (final ordr to cease and desist).
181. LERNER, supra note 5, at 14.
182. Notice of Charges, Fishbein, supra note 4, 11 182-85; see Rice & Bell, supra note 7.
183. Wolfram, Mapping the Minefield, supra note 6, at 56.
184. See Stevens & Thomas, supra note 6, at Al (suggesting the settlement indicates that law firms
will now be called upon to disclose damaging information about the government-regulated companies
they represent).
185. Helms, supra note 9, at 283-84.
186. Villa, supra no'e 3, at 110.
187. See, e.g., Notice of Charges, Fishbeinsupranote4,pasim (administrative complaint by Office
of Thrift Supervision against law firm for, inter alia, ethical violations in bank examination).
188. Helms, supra note 9, at 283-84.
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. Auditor's Duty to Regulators
An auditor's duty to disclose a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct to third
parties" provides an analogous disclosure framework for attorneys since both
professions represent the interests of the client to outside parties."9 The court in
Gold v. DCL Inc.' determined that when an auditor gives an opinion or certifies
a statement, the auditor assumes a role which carries a special relationship of trust
to the public. In Gold, the defendant's auditor was discharged after a dispute with
the defendant relating to a qualified opinion which the auditor anticipated giving."
The defendant's auditor did not publicly disclose information relating to its intent
to qualify an opinion. 93 The plaintiff in Gold claimed that the defendant's former
auditor either owed investors an independent duty of disclosure or aided and abetted
the defendant's market manipulation by failing to disclose its expected qualified
opinion."
The court in Gold recognized that mere possession and nondisclosure of material
facts does not alone create liability under SEC Rule 10(b)(5).'95 In addition, some
relationship which generates .a duty to inform must exist." The auditor in Gold
had not issued a public opinion nor any certification concerning the financial figures
released by the defendant which allegedly induced the public to purchase stock."7
Furthermore, the auditor had not invited the public in any way to rely on its
financial statements. 9 The court further found that the earnings information relied
on by the plaintiff clearly noted that the figures were unaudited. '"' The court
concluded that no special relationship with the purchasing public existed which
could impose a duty of disclosure upon the former auditors. Furthermore, absent
a special relationship, the auditor's silence and inaction could not constitute aiding
and abetting."'
In In re Rospatch Securities Litigation,' the court determined that an indepen-
dent auditor had a duty to disclose ongoing securities fraud. The complaint alleged
that an independent auditing firm knew, or was reckless in not knowing, of alleged
fraud by the defendant following a significant markdown of the defendant's net worth.'
189. Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040 (1 1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
946 (1987).
190. See also OTS v. Ernst & Young, 786 F. Supp. 46, 47 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that OTS could
investigate accounting firm and enforce subpoena).
191. 399 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
192. Id. at 1125.
193. Id. at 1127.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1128.
201. Id.
202. 760 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
203. Id. at 1254.
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The court in Ro:,patch noted that when an auditing firm gives an opinion or
certifies statements, the firm publicly assumes a role that carries a special
relationship of trust to the public.' The auditor, thus, holds itself out as an
independent professional source of assurance that the audited company's financial
statements are accurate and reliable. 5 The Rospatch court recognized "the spirit
of the federal securities laws" requires that those who know of serious wrongdoing
disclose the wrongdoing to the public.20 Therefore, the court in Rospatch imposed
a duty to disclose upon an accounting firm who knows, or recklessly fails to know,
of an ongoing fraud.'
The accounting firm in In re National Smelting of New Jersey, Inc.2"' was found
to have no disclosure duty to bond investors. The accounting firm audited the
balance sheet of a bond issuer, conducted a review, and prepared a draft of a
financial forecast attached to a preliminary statement issued in connection with a
bond offering.'
The court in National Smelting set forth a "flexible duty test" to determine when
a non-insider2"' might have a duty to disclose under SEC Rule 10(b)(5)." The
flexible duty test is based on four factors: (1) the relationship between the parties,
(2) the defendant's benefit from the relationship, (3) the defendant's awareness of
the plaintiffs reliance on the relationship in making investment decisions, and (4)
the defendant's role in initiating the transaction. "' The court found that the
accounting firm's relationship with the plaintiffs was limited and indirect."1 3 The
court also found that the only benefit received by the accounting firm was its
normal fee.14 Furthermore, any reliance by the plaintiff was offset by the specific
language counseling caution, because the statements were unaudited.2" Finally, the
court found that the accounting firm had not initiated the bond offering which
formed the basis of the lawsuit."6 Therefore, given the limited and circumspect
nature of the accourting work performed and the accounting firm's lack of financial
interest in the bond offering, the court in National Smelting concluded that the
accounting firm had no disclosure duty."7
204. Id. at 1251 (ciing Fisher v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1252; see Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1045 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987) (finding disclosure duty where accounting firm had actual knowledge
of fraud and the firm's inaction while a fraud was perpetrated was misleading).
207. Id.
208. 722 F. Supp. 152 (D.N.J. 1989).
209. Id. at 171.
210. A non-insider is someone other than a corporate officer, director, or controlling shareholder.
Id. at 170.
211. Id. (citing White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974)).
212. National Sneiing, 722 F. Supp. at 170. No one factor is determinative. Id.
213. Id. at 171.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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The auditors' disclosure duty provides a guideline for a similar obligation in the
legal profession. The nature of legal work entails the possession of facts and
communications from the client. The attorney-client relationship may create a duty
to inform, particularly when the attorney issues a legal opinion or certification
which could induce the public to view the client more or less favorably. In that
situation, the attorney expects that the public will rely on its documents. Thus,
under Gold, a regulatory attorney establishes a special relationship with the public
by preparing legal opinions and certifications, and the attorney's subsequent silence
or inaction could constitute aiding and abetting. The disclosure duty is strengthened
per Rospatch if the attorney knows, or recklessly fails to know, of a client's
wrongdoing.
In addition to the relationship and reliance by the public, two other factors were
considered in National Smelting. First, the benefit the attorney receives could be
significant, particularly if the compensation exceeds normal fees. Second, the
attorney's participation in initiating the wrongdoing could support the imposition of
a duty to disclose.
2. Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Disclose
In Chiarella v. United States, 28 the Supreme Court held that, under federal
securities laws, a duty to disclose arises from a fiduciary relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed whether an attorney has a duty to disclose his client's fraud to a third
party, such as a regulatory agency, some authority suggests that, absent a fiduciary
relationship, no such duty is owed.219 However, in order to demand some
disclosure duty on the part of attorneys, a regulatory agency could argue that the
agency stands in the position of a stockholder of the regulated company. Thus, the
regulated company and its counsel could owe the same fiduciary duty to the agency
as that owed to a shareholdern' The OTS claims that the fiduciary duty that a
corporation's board of directors owes to its shareholders supports an attorney's
disclosure duty to the public.
21
In Schatz v. Rosenberg,"2 the court addressed whether a law firm is liable to a
defrauded third party when an attorney allegedly aids the fraud by remaining silent.
The plaintiff, who was selling an interest in two companies, alleged that the attorney
had failed to disclose material facts about the buyer's financial condition in violation
of securities law and common law.2
218. 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
219. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490-92 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475
(1992) (holding that an attorney has no duty to disclose absent a fiduciary relationship).
220. See FDIC General Counsel Declines to Embrace Higher Dutyfor Fiduciaries in Failing Banks.,
55 BANKING REP. (BNA) 941 (Dec. 10, 1990); Helms, supra note 9, at 284 (observing that the OTS, as
the ultimate insurer of depository institutions, has claimed an equity position in financial institutions and
thus an attorney owes a duty to the OTS not unlike that owed by a board of directors to its shareholders).
221. Remarks of Harris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 411.
222. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
223. Id. at 489.
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The Schatz cour: held that an attorney has no duty to disclose the client's
fraudulent conduct absent a fiduciary relationship between the parties.' The court
reasoned that if attorneys had a duty to disclose information to third parties,
attorneys would have an incentive not to press clients for information and thereby
be unwitting accomplices to the fraud.' The court distinguished cases where
lawyers have been field liable for affirmative misrepresentations contained in legal
opinions or other public disclosure documents. 26 The court also distinguished the
attorney's misrepresentation of the facts to a third party from the attorney's failure
to disclose facts omitted or misrepresented by the client to the third party.227
Finding no fiduciary relationship, the court in Schatz concluded that the attorney had
no duty to disclose the client's improprieties to third parties.'
B. Prior Attorney Disclosure Actions
1. No Disclosure Duty to Third Parties
The SEC in In re Carter"" announced its view of the appropriate response for
an attorney who discovers that his client is failing to make appropriate disclosures.
The SEC interpreted "unethical or improper professional conduct" as that term is
used in SEC Rule 2(e) which sets the standard for suspending an attorney from
practicing before the SEC.' The SEC determined that when a lawyer with
significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company's compliance with the
disclosure becomes aware of substantial and continuing failure to satisfy the
disclosure requirements, the attorney's continued participation violates professional
standards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance.' If the
attorney's initial counseling is not followed, more affirmative action is required to
avoid the inference that the attorney is aiding the nondisclosure scheme." The
attorney could resign or approach the board of directors or take other prompt action
that lends the conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the
224. Id. at 490; see Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 846 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that attorney
who wrote opinion letter for promoters of fraudulent tax shelter had no obligation to disclose nor correct
the letter which was circulated to investors without the attorney's authorization). The court in Ackerman
observed that while federal law would govern the attorney's duty to the investors once the attorney had
spoken, a silent participant's liability for transactions depends on state law. Id. at 846; see also Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Fryar v. Abell,
492 U.S. 914 (1989) (finding that absent a relationship of trust and confidence, lawyers have no duty to
disclose information about clients to third party investors).
225. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 493.
226. Id. at 491-92.
227. Id. at 491.
228. Id. at 490.
229. [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 82,847, at 84,145 (Feb. 28, 1991). But see
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (stating that securities lawyer's
primary responsibility is to the investing public).
230. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,146.
231. Id. at 84,172.
232. Id.
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problemY3 The SEC acknowledged that an attorney is not required to disclose a
client's illegal act either publicly or to an affected third party.'
A nondisclosure theory such as in Schatz or Carter relies on the attorney-client
privilege with its underlying confidentiality principle. Attorneys who criticize an
obligation to inform regulatory agencies of a client's misconduct rely on the
attorney-client relationship and its concurrent duty of confidentiality. 5 Further-
more, opponents of disclosure contend that a disclosure duty to third parties, such
as regulatory agencies, has no source in statute or regulation. 6 However, the
nondisclosure theory appears to ignore the possibility that the attorney is actually
aware, or has knowledge, of the client's improprieties. The government agencies'
regulations and the Rules of Professional Conduct clearly create a duty on the
attorney who knows of the client's wrongdoing. 7
2. Duty to Disclose to Third Parties
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,"s the attorney for a
bankrupt corporation was obligated to disclose client communications when the
bankruptcy trustee waived the attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff in Weintraub
was investigating the debtor corporation for commodity exchange violations when
the corporation filed bankruptcy. 9 During the investigation, the defendant-
attorney asserted the attorney-client privilege and refused to respond to certain
inquiries.' At the plaintiffs request, the bankruptcy trustee waived the corpora-
tion's attorney-client privilege.u
The attorney-client privilege promotes full and frank communications between
attorneys and their clients.242 Because a corporation acts through its agents and
cannot directly speak to its lawyers, it relies on its constituents to exercise or waive
the privilege when disclosure is in the corporation's best interest. 3 Clearly, the
power to waive the privilege in a solvent corporation rests with the corporation's
management, who must exercise the privilege consistent with their fiduciary duty
to act in the best interest of the corporation.' 4 Furthermore, when control of the
corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert or waive the attorney-
client privilege passes as well.24
Because the attorney-client privilege is controlled, outside of bankruptcy, by a
corporation's management, the court in Commodity Futures reasoned that in
233. Id.
234. Id. at 84,173.
235. Helms, supra note 9, at 283.
236. Id.; see also Villa, supra note 3, at 118.
237. Remarks of Harris Weinstein, supra note 2, at 412-13.
238. 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
239. Id. at 345.
240. Id. at 346.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 348.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 348-49.
245. Id. at 349.
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bankruptcy the party with duties similar to those of a solvent corporation's
management should control the privilege."' Because the trustee has broad
management authority over the debtor, the trustee's role was deemed most similar
to the management of a solvent corporationul Therefore, the bankruptcy trustee
has the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege relating to pre-
bankruptcy communications.u Thus, the attorney could be compelled to disclose
client communications to third parties."
Under Commodity Futures, a lawyer may have a disclosure duty to a regulatory
agency. A receiver such as the OTS, like a bankruptcy trustee, differs from a
normal successor in interest. Neither the receiver nor the bankruptcy trustee
voluntarily "step into the shoes" of a bankrupt corporation's management."'
Furthermore, the receiver is usually neither a party to the original inequitable or
illegal conduct nor is the receiver.in a position to take action prior to assuming the
bankrupt's assets to cure any associated defects."
C. Recommended Approach
Attorneys claim that volunteering client information to the public or regulatory
agencies would violate the attorneys' ethical duties to the client. The regulatory
agencies, however, deny the existence of any conflict and maintain that the
disclosure requirements coincide with established ethical rulesY2 The approach
taken in In re National Smelting 3 provides a balancing test to satisfy concerns
from both sides of the disclosure issue.
For example, assuming the flexible duty test set forth in National Smelting was
applied to the alleged facts resulting in the Kaye Scholer Settlement, the law firm
clearly had a duty to disclose the client's wrongdoing. The flexible duty test
provides four factors to consider in determining whether a duty to disclose exists.
First, a relationship ex.isted between the law firm and its client as well as with the
regulatory agency. In the Kaye Scholer Settlement, the law firm's relationship with
the client as well as the regulatory agency was direct and unlimited, particularly
after the law firm interposed itself between the client and the agency. Second,
although the law firm's benefit might have only been a fee, the fees earned were
substantial. Third, by directly acting as a liaison between the client and the
regulatory agency, the law firm likely was aware that those parties placed reliance
on the relationship. Finally, the law firm, while not initiating the underlying
improprieties that formed the basis of the lawsuit, allegedly aided and abetted the
client's wrongdoing. Therefore, given the allegedly unlimited and careless nature of
246. Id. at 351-52.
247. Id. at 353.
248. Id. at 358.
249. Id.
250. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 751 (9th Cir. 1992).
251. Id.
252. Remarks of Harrs Weinstein, supra note 2, at 413.
253. 722 F. Supp. 152 (D.N.J. 1989).
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the legal work performed and the legal firm's substantial financial interest in the
regulatory examination, the law firm had a disclosure duty.
V. Conclusion
Attorneys and commentators are up in arms over recent regulatory agency actions,
such as the Kaye Scholer Settlement. The regulatory agencies' actions to compel
disclosure of client communications and improprieties by the attorneys have been
viewed as infringing on the traditional attorney-client relationship and its confidenti-
ality principle. However, the critics of regulatory disclosure seem to evade the
"knowledge" element contained in both the ethical and statutory rules.
An attorney who knows about a client's impropriety cannot hide behind
Oklahoma's Rule 1.6. This admonition is particularly true when the attorney knows
the impropriety affects a regulatory agency, by virtue of the agency's specific
questions, in routine or litigious compliance examinations relating to an area where
the improper conduct is occurring. Furthermore, the lawyer would have a disclosure
duty to the regulatory agency, assuming the agency has a regulation which prohibits
unethical conduct and aiding and abetting in such conduct. Clearly, the disclosure
requirements under such a government regulation coincide with the ethical rules and
do not impair the established attorney-client relationship.
Patricia F. Reilly
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